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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
JAMES L. HATCH and DELLA L. 
HATCH, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case N(:). 
8937 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Respondents agree with the Statements of Fact 
expressed in the Brief of Appellant, except to add that 
Donald G. Prince, Land Examiner called by the State of 
Utah, testified also on Cross-Examination that in virtually 
all selections made by the State of Utah a prospective pur-
chaser from the State had already chosen the land selected 
and requested that State to acquire the same from the Fed-
eral Government. Thus the instant exchange, apparently 
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2 
contrary to the broad conclusion elicited from Mr. Prince 
on Direct Examination, effected a result equally as bene-
ficial to the State of Utah, and as consistent with the stat-
ute directing a "compacting" of the State's interests, as 
would have an exchange locating the selected lands con-
tiguous to pre-existing state holdings and in effect did 
"compact" the State's holdings because it extricated the 
State's interests from a location inaccessibly within the 
boundaries of a national forest (Tr. p. 33). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
SCHOOL SECTION LANDS ARE HELD BY 
THE STATE OF UTAH IN A PROPRIETARY 
CAPACITY; HOWEVER, EVEN ASSUMING 
THAT THEY ARE NOT, THE TRIAL COURT 
CORRECTLY RULED IN FAVOR OF THE DE-
FENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS. 
POINT II 
THE UTAH STATUTES HAVE NEVER RE-
QUIRED OR EVEN CONTEMPLATED A RES-
ERVATION OF MINERALS IN EXCHANGES 
OF LAND WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERN-
MENT. 
A__;.Sec. 65-1-15 UCA 1953 was designed to cor-
rect administrative abuses in sales and cannot 
be extended to affect federal exct~r_ges. 
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3 
B-There can be no implied reservation in favor 
of any grantor. 
POINT III 
THE APPLICABLE FEDERAL LEGISLATION, 
TO THE EXCLUSION OF STATE STATUTES, 
CONTROLS IF UTAH STATUTES SHOULD BE 
CONSTRUED TO PROVIDE FOR A MINERAL 
RESERVATION IN EXCHANGES. 
POINT IV 
FEDERAL EXCHANGES MUST BE OF EQUIV-
ALENT ESTATES, AND THIS WAS AN 
EQUIVALENT EXCHANGE ONLY IF THE 
MINERAL ESTATE PASSED TO THE UNITED 
STATES AND ITS SUCCESSORS, THE DE-
FENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS. 
POINT V 
VOLUMINOUS TRANSACTIONS EFFECTED 
BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER 1919 HAVE 
EVOLVED A RULE OF PROPERTY CON-
CLUDING UTAH FROM ASSERTING TITLE 
TO THE MINERALS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SCHOOL SECTION LANDS ARE HELD BY 
THE STATE OF UTAH IN A PROPRIETARY 
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CAPACITY; HOWEVER, EVEN ASSUMING 
THAT THEY ARE NOT, THE TRIAL COURT 
CORRECTLY RULED IN FAVOR OF THE DE-
FENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS. 
In Strand vs. State, 132 P. 2d 1011, 16 Wash. 2nd 107, 
it is held that: 
"The accepted rule is that a State acts in its 
proprietary capacity when it undertakes to dispose 
of public lands. This rule has been recognized al-
most since the inception of the principal of equitable 
estoppel." 
Cited for that proposition are numerous highly re-
spected jurisdictions including the Federal Supreme Court 
as it expressed the rule in United States vs. California and 
Oregon Land Company, 148 U. S. 31, 13 S. Ct. 458, 37 L. 
Ed. 354 and United States vs. Dalles Military Road Com-
pany, 148 U. S. 49, 13 S. Ct. 465, 37 L. Ed. 362. The facts 
assumed by the rule and in existence in this case ( i. e. the 
state disposing of public lands) take this litigation outside 
of the scope of Van Wagoner vs. Whitmore, 58 Utah 418, 
199 P. 670, a case applying the statute of limitations. 
All rules of property must certainly militate against 
a State acquiring an unfair advantage of an innocent pur-
chaser merely by reason of the fact that the State is sover-
eign. Conceding as we do the high public purpose in pres-
ervation of trusts for the benefit of the public schools of 
this State, it must nevertheless be that long established prin-
ciples of equity and property cannot grant special dispen-
sations or unfair immunity against supervening rights of 
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5 
innocent purchasers and proprietors of land to their great 
detriment. 
The defenses of estoppel, laches, unjust enrichment, 
and all equitable doctrines should be available against a 
state as well as against any other grantor of land irrespec-
tive of such state's capacity as a trustee. If a contrary rule 
were adopted, there would be no capacity other than sover-
eign or governmental since every asset, chose in action, or 
property interest of any government is held for the benefit 
of its subjects or some segment thereof. 
Notwithstanding the Court's holding upon this par-
ticular phase of the Appellant's argument we will demon-
strate later that it is immaterial whether or not the State 
holds school lands as a sovereign but nevertheless urge at 
this point that the equities compel a holding, at least in the 
narrow circumstance where the State disposes of property,. 
that it is a proprietor as opposed to a sovereign. 
POINT II 
THE UTAH STATUTES HAVE NEVER RE-
QUIRED OR EVEN CONTEMPLATED A RES-
ERVATION OF MINERALS IN EXCHANGES 
OF LAND WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERN-
MENT. 
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Section 65-1-271 and 65-l-702 UCA 1953 were a part 
of the Revised Statutes of 1896 and continued substantially 
unamended until the time of enactment of Section 65-1-15, 
the statute upon which Appellant relies. 
The Appellant argues that 65-1-27 applied not to ex .. 
changes of school lands but only to selection of other grants 
made in the Enabling Act in quantity. The complete answer 
to this is that the Indemnity Selection Act, now Sections 851 
and 852, Title 43, USCA (Sections 2275, 2276 of the Revised 
Statutes) was first enacted February 28, 1891, or five years 
prior to the first adoption of 65-1-27 and 65-1-70. There-
fore the Utah enactments were expressly implementary to 
the Indemnity Exchange Act. The Appellant argues also 
that at the time of enactment of 65-1-27 it was thought that 
school lands, title to which had already vested in the State, 
could not be exchanged for lands lying outside of Federal 
1Section 65-1-27 
"All selections of land shall be made in legal subdivisions according to 
the United States survey, and when a selection has been made and ap-
proved by the Board, it shall take such action as may be necessary to 
secure the approval of the proper officers of the United States and the 
final transfer to the state of the lands selected. The Board may cancel, 
relinquish or release the claims of the State too, and may reconvey to 
the United States, any particular tract of land erroneously listed to the 
State, or any tract upon which, at the time of selection, a bona fide 
claim has been initiated by an actual Settler." 
2Section 65-1-70 
"In order to compact, as far as practicable, the land holdings of the 
State, the Board is hereby authorized to exchange any of the land held 
by the State for other land of equal value within the State held by 
other proprietors; and upon request of the Board the Governor is here-
by authorized to execute and deliver the necessary patents to such 
-other proprietors and receive therefrom proper deeds of the lands so 
exchanged; provided that no exchange shall be made by the Land 
Board until the patent for the land so received in exchange shall have 
been issued to such proprietors or their grantors." 
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reservations. The simple explanation is that at the time 
California vs. Deseret Water, Oil and Irrigation Company, 
243 U.S. 214, 37 S. Ct. 394, was decided in 1917 the United 
States Supreme Court said: 
"Selections aggregating many thousands of acres 
have been made in reliance upon [the Land Decision 
holding that vested school sections could be exchanged 
under Sec. 2275] and that no doubt large expendi-
tures of money have been made in good faith upon 
the selected lands. It is therefore urged that such 
construction has become a rule of property. In this 
situation we should be slow to disturb a ruling of 
the Department of the government to which is com-
mitted the administration of public lands." 
Both Sections 65-1-27 and 65-1-70 are sufficiently broad to 
embrace, and in fact have always been intended to embrace, 
exchanges of vested school lands lying within the exterior 
boundaries of a national forest for indemnity lands selected 
outside said reservation. 
Section 65-1-70 authorizes an exchange by the State 
Land Board "with any other proprietors". The Appellant 
cannot seriously contend that the Federal Government is 
not a "proprietor" of land within this State. It seems to 
advance an argument that the revision of the Utah Statutes 
in 1933 to delete the phrasing "by the Government of the 
United States" has relation back to 1925 to impose an un-
natural construction upon 65-1-70 never intended. This 
Court is amply aware of the authority granted to the com-
mission to revise the 1933 Statutes and readily will per-
ceive that the deletion of the matter cited by the Appellant 
was purely to remove surplusage. It would be ridiculous, 
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.we claim, to ascribe to a 1933 amendment made by the code 
commission any manifestation of legislative intent to enact 
·a rule of construction upon a statute applicable retroactively 
to the year 1925. 
We are certain that this court will not seriously con-
sider the argument advanced in tedious and meticulous 
detail by the Appellant that Sections 65-1-27 and 65-1-70 
did not in 1925 authorize the Utah State Land Board to 
make exchanges with the Federal government of lands lying 
within a National Forest granted to the State by the En-
abling Act for lands lying outside a National Forest and 
owned by the United States. 
A-Sec. 65-1-15 UCA 1953 was designed to cor-
rect administrative abuses in sales and cannot 
be extended to affect federal exchanges. 
Section 65-1-15 can relate only to sales. The language 
of the Act is : 
"All coal and other mineral deposited in lands 
belonging to the State of Utah are hereby reserved to 
the State. Such deposits are reserved from sale. 
* * *" 
The second proviso is an express restriction on the scope 
of the first sentence. In the Utah case of Bird and Jex 
Company, et al. vs. Funk, et al., 85 P. 2d 831, 96 Utah 450, 
it is stated that the office of a proviso in a statute is to 
qualify or restrain its generality or to exclude some possible 
ground of misinterpretation of it as extending to cases not 
intended by the legislature to be brought within its purview. 
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This is the exact situation with which we are confronted 
here. The proviso must limit the scope of the first sentence 
to restrict its application singularly to sales. 
The transaction with which we are here concerned is 
an "exchange" and not a "sale". "Sale" is not synonymous 
with "exchange". See the numerous cases collected .in Vol-
ume 38 Words and Phrases, pages 100 to 105. In Haun vs. 
Malone, 176 N. W. 393, the Supreme Court of Iowa held 
that: 
"The test for determining whether there has 
been a sale or exchange of property is whether there 
was a fixed price for which the exchange was to 
be made. If there was a fixed price, the transaction 
is a sale, if not, an exchange." 
The State's Statutes contain a number of provisiOns ex-
pressly dealing with "sales" ( 65-1-31 et. seq., 65-1-41, 65-1-
42) all contemplating the transfer of property for a fixed, 
money consideration. Watson vs. Odell, 198 P. 772, 58 Utah 
276, holds that a "sale" means the transfer of property for 
money. 
Section 65-1-27 deals particularly with exchanges as 
does 65-1-70. It is a cardinal rule of construction that as 
between two statutes apparently in conflict the one dealing 
more particularly or specifically with the subject matter 
must prevail over the one dealing with it generally. Uni-
versity of Utah vs. Richards, 20 Utah 457, 59 P. 96. As 
opposed to the argument advanced by the Appellant that 
State executives are prohibited from making an exchange 
of both the State's mineral and surface interests, Section 
65-1-27 requires the State Land Board to "take all action 
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required to secure the approval of the United States for 
the transfer to the State of lands selected." This would 
require alienation of the minerals under the express hold-
ing of Wyoming vs. United States, 255 U. S. 489, 41 S. Ct. 
393, argued more fully hereinafter, and the essential inter-
pretation of other Federal legislation. Section 65-1-70, cum-
ulatively to 65-1-27, permits exactly the transaction which 
occurred here-an exchange of land within a national forest 
for unappropriated public domain outside. The direct testi-
mony at the trial, modified on cross examination, may have 
been that the transactions here did not "compact" the 
State's holdings. Even assuming that the testimony was 
competent to prove that we are confident that the State, 
having acted upon the pretext of compliance with the Stat-
ute cannot rescind any exchange solely because one officer's 
opinion is that the strict letter of the enactment was not 
followed. But the result directed by the legislature WaS 
reached in any event, to-wit: The extrication of the State's 
interest from the inaccessibility of location within a forest 
reserve, precisely the situation viewed by the United States 
Supreme Court in California vs. Deseret Wate-r, Oil & Irri-
gation Company, 243 U. S. 415, 37 S. Ct. 394. 
It is very evident that 65-1-15 deals particularly and 
exclusively with "sales"; that 65-1-27 and 65-1-70 deal par-
ticularly and to the express exclusion of 65-1-15, with "ex-
changes". The sections are entirely harmonious and con-
sistent yet, when dealing with a particular transaction, 
mutually exclusive to and with each other. 
The foregoing argument is given great additional 
weight by reference to Page 28 of the Laws of 1917, where 
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there was appropriated $25,000.00 for an investigation of 
the State Land Board and other State agencies, and to Page 
469 of the 1919 House Journal, containing a report of the 
Committee which made that investigation. 
Out of this report arose Chapter 107 of the Laws of 
Utah 1919, which is now Section 65-1-15, the statute upon 
which the Appellant relies. This report is a public docu-
ment of which this court may take judicial notice and con-
tains an account of numerous sales of public lands by the 
State for small and insufficient consideration, which lands 
for their valuable minerals were being sold for many times 
their cost by the persons who had dealt unscrupulously with 
the State. The report recommended that sales be suspended 
for five years and that the lands be leased during the mora-
torium. The report further recommended that the State 
continue to take the greatest possible advantage of avail-
able exchanges with the Federal Government to compact 
the State's holdings, to extricate its lands inside reserva-
tions and to consolidate holdings within national forests; 
to release interests of the State in desert school sections 
and secure indemnity lands suitable for grazing. 
This Court must look to the evil sought to be corrected 
by the enacted bill and no further. Norville vs. Tax Com-
mission, 98 Utah 170, 97 P. 2nd 937, 126 A. L. R. 1318. The 
evil certainly did not lie in exchanges with the Federal Gov-
ernment; it lay only in sales to private individuals and the 
latter are the only class of situations to which Section 65-
1-15 can be given application. 
B-There can be no implied reservation in favor 
of any grantor. 
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A general conveyance of land without any exception 
or reservation of the minerals therein carries with it the 
minerals as well as the surface. Montana Mining Co. vs. 
St. Louis Mining and Milling Co., 204 U. S. 204, 51 L. Ed. 
444, 27 S. Ct. 254. 
The presumption established as an ancient principle in 
the law of property is that the grantor conveys the land 
free from any reservation, except such as he has expressed 
in his own grant. Georgia vs. Cincinnati S. R. Co., 248 U. 
S. 26, 63 L. Ed. 104, 39 S. Ct. 14. 
The stipulation of the parties hereto (Tr. p. 11) accu-
rately expresses that a reservation of minerals is non-exist-
ent in those documents by which the parties consummated 
an exchange of the disputed lands from the State of Utah to 
the United States of America. In fact the grant negatives 
any intention to create a reservation by being absolute in 
form. The selection list recites that the 
"State of Utah makes application under the pro-
visions of the acts of Congress of July 16, 1894, [the 
enabling act] and the acts supplementary and amen-
datory thereto for the following described unappro-
priated non-mineral public lands in lieu of, or as in-
demnity for, the corresponding school lands, for 
losses to its grant for common schools, assigned and 
designated as bases therefore, and agrees to accept 
the selected tracts in full satisfaction of the bases 
assigned." 
Embodied in the Indemnity Exchange Act, (Section 
851, Title 43), there is the following language: 
"The selection of lands in lieu thereof by the 
state or territory shall be a waiver of its right to 
said sections." 
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"Waiver of right" can only refer to those rights which 
were conferred upon the state by virtue of Section 6 of the 
Enabling Act, wherein the state is granted all Sections 2, 
16, 32 and 36. A "waiver of right" is a "relinquishment or 
refusal to accept a right," In re Auerbach's Estate, 65 P. 
488, 23 Utah 529. In Smiley vs. Barker, 83 F. 684 (9th Cir.) 
a waiver is defined as 
"where one in possession of any right, whether con-
ferred by law or by contract, and of full knowledge 
of the material facts, does or forebears the doing of 
something inconsistent with the existence of the 
right or of his intention to rely upon it. Thereupon, 
he is said to have waived it, and he is precluded 
from claiming anything by reason of it afterwards." 
See also the numerous cases collected in Vol. 44, page 419, 
WORDS AND PHRASES. 
The term "right", when referring to property interests, 
includes all the interest, estate, claim or title of the indi-
vidual granting by use of that term, in the property affected. 
See Shewell vs. Board of Goshen Union Local School Dis-
trict, 96 North East 2nd, 323 88 Ohio App. 1, where it was 
held that: 
"The provision in a deed conveying realty 'ex-
cept the "right" owned by the school district or board 
of education to about one-fourth of an acre being 
used as a school house lot,' constituted an exception 
of the fee simple title to the school lot and was not 
merely an expression of permissive use." 
The Enabling Act contains language of exact itnport 
and can be construed only to mean that title to the entire 
surface and mineral interests were transferred to the Fed-
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eral Government when the State selected lieu lands. Sec-
tion 6 of that Act requires an exchange of equivalents, stat-
ing that Sections numbered 2, 16, 32 and 36 or other lands 
equivalent thereto are granted, indemnity lands to be se-
lected in such manner as the Legislature may provide with 
approval of the Secretary of the Interior. Section 12, para., 
graph 3 of the Enabling Act provides that the State of Utah 
shall not be entitled to any further or other grants of land 
and Section 13 provides that indemnity lands shall be se-
lected under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior. 
Indemnity land is additional and therefore "other" lands if 
a part of the fee simple estate in base lands is reserved. 
Thus the State of Utah is, contrary to Section 12 of the 
Enabling Act, receiving "further and other lands" if it 
reserves minerals in lieu exchanges. Clearly a state reser-
vation of minerals is entirely inconsistent with the express, 
affirmative, language of the Enabling Act. 
There being no express reservation, but on the con-
trary an absolute grant of the mineral estate, recited in the 
instruments (Exhibits "A" and "B") effecting the ex-
change, the only remaining consideration can be whether 
or not the Utah State Statute (65-1-15) can be extended 
so as to embrace this transaction. 
A parallel pronouncement and of equal dignity to the 
principle against implied reservations is the universally ac-
cepted rule that a statute may not be extended by construc-
tion beyond the purpose intended by the Legislature. United 
States vs M eEl vain, 272 U. S. 633, 71 L. Ed. 451, 4 7 S. Ct. 
219. As we have pointed out in the argument on the preced-
ing Sub-Point, the legislation upon which the Plaintiff relies 
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here was directed toward abuses practiced in the Land 
Board in the sales of public and school lands to private 
persons for their mineral value and was never intended to 
apply to the Federal Government or to exchanges there-
with; on the contrary, Sections 65-1-27 and 65-1-70 were 
intended by the Legislature to continue to control those 
exchanges. The Court may take judicial notice of the fact 
that Section 65-1-15 was introduced in the Legislature by 
then State Senator George H. Dern, who later became Gov-
ernor of the State of Utah, holding office for two terms 
between 1925 and 1933; further that during his terms as 
Governor, he was by virtue of such office Chairman of 
the State Land Board which was comprised of the Governor, 
Secretary of State, and the Attorney General, and that as 
Chairman of the Land Board, he effected numerous ex-
changes with the Federal Government and at no time at-
tempted to make any reservation of minerals in such ex-
changes. Many hundreds of exchanges had in fact been 
made long before the introduction of Section 65-1-15 into 
the provisions of Utah law, and the Legislatures successively 
had understood and agreed that the provisions of Sections 
65-1-27 and 65-1-70 were sufficient implementary legisla-
tion to authorize and to continue to authorize the exchanges. 
Numerous exchanges were carried on both before and after 
the enactment of Section 65-1-15 involving in excess of a 
million acres of land and are matters of public record within 
the Utah State Land Board, and therefore matters of which 
this Court may take judicial notice. State Board of Land 
Commissioners vs. Ririe, 56 Ut. 213, 190 P. 59 and Section 
78-25-1, U. C. A. 1953. Virtually no changes and certainly 
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no changes of any consequence have been made in the provi-
sions of 65-1-27 and 65-1-70 since the date of their enact-
ment in 1896 to the present time. 
Two fundamental rules of property sharply limit 65-
1-15: First, a statute may not be extended by construction 
beyond the purpose intended by the Legislature, and Sec-
ond, no grant nor the words contained therein may be ex-
tended by implication in order to create a reservation in 
favor of the grantor. 
The practical construction given a statute for a long 
period of time has been considered strong evidence of the 
meaning of the law. Such contemporaneous or practical 
construction is treated by the Courts as of importance, and 
as entitled to great weight, respect and persuasive in-
fluence. 50 Am. Jur. Statutes Section 319. The interpreta-
tion placed upon the statute by the Utah State Land Board 
and by the Legislature itself is clearly indicated by the 
action of the Legislature in Chapter 56, Laws of 1927, to 
provide an express reservation of minerals when conveying 
lands to the United States at the mouth of Bear River form-
ing a part of the bed of the Great Salt Lake. The construc-
tion placed by the Legislature itself upon Sections 65-1-27, 
65-1-15 and 65-1-70 is to the effect that minerals are not 
reserved when dealing with the Federal Government or its 
wards. See Chapter 144, Laws of 1957 wherein a sale of 
lands to the Ute Indian Tribe contained another express 
reservation of minerals. 
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POINT III 
THE APPLICABLE FEDERAL LEGISLATION, 
TO THE EXCLUSION OF STATE STATUTES, 
CONTROLS IF UTAH STATUTES SHOULD BE 
CONSTRUED TO PROVIDE FOR A MINERAL 
RESERVATION IN EXCHANGES. 
The Appellant in its brief cites the case of Newton vs. 
State Board of Land Commissioners, et al., 37 Idaho 58, 219 
P. 1053. Upon close observation of the facts in that case, 
including the Admissions Bill and State Constitution re-
quiring that School Section lands be disposed of only at 
public sale and for not less than $10.00 an acre, it will 
readily be observed that the State of Idaho has organic pro-
visions prohibiting exchanges of land for any purpose, a 
situation clearly not obtaining in the State of Utah. 
We are not before this Court to argue that the State 
of Utah does riot have sovereignty to legislate with respect 
to exchanges which it effects with the Federal Government, 
nor are we here to state that the Federal Government may 
legislate with respect to interests vested in the State of 
Utah without implementing and consensual state enact-
ments. We do contend, however, that the State of Utah had 
to observe, in effecting these exchanges, the provisions of 
Federal Law as applied by decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court and that never did any of the executive or 
legislative officers of the State of Utah at any times ma-
terial to these proceedings believe that such implementing 
and consensual legislation was not in existence as the long-
practiced, consistent, uniform, and practical construction 
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of those statutes shows abundantly. The legislature in en-
acting Section 65-1-15 had no intention, design or purpose 
to prohibit the State of Utah from entering into exchanges 
with the Federal Government for the benefit of the State. 
We also doubt that it is necessary for the Court here 
to apply the doctrine of Dyer vs. Sims, 341 U.S. 22 (1951); 
nevertheless if this Court should hold that the Utah stat-
utes have contemplated a reservation of minerals in ex-
changes with the Federal Government or that the officiak; 
of the State of Utah had no state-enacted authority to enter 
into exchanges with the Federal Government upon the terms 
imposed by Federal Legislation as construed by U. S. Su-
preme Court Decisions, then Dyer vs. Sims is clearly in 
point. In that case the officers of the State of West Virginia 
had committed that State to an interstate compact which 
was later ratified by Congress. The United States Supreme 
Court held that at the point of ratification the interpretation 
of the West Virginia Constitution became a Federal ques-
tion. Mr. Justice Frankfurter speaking for the Court at 341 
U. S., page 28, said : 
"Of course every deference will be shown to 
what the highest court of the State deems to be the 
law and policy of its state, particularly where re-
condite or unique features of local law are urged. 
Deference is one thing; submission to a State's own 
determination of whether it has undertaken an ob-
ligation, what that obligation is, and whether it con-
flicts with the disability of the state to undertake 
it is quite another." 
A concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Robert M. Jack-
son indicated that West Virginia was estopped from repud-
iating the contract. 
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POINT IV 
FEDERAL EXCHANGES MUST BE OF EQUIV-
ALENT ESTATES, AND THIS WAS AN 
EQUIVALENT EXCHANGE ONLY IF THE 
MINERAL ESTATE PASSED TO THE UNITED 
STATES AND ITS SUCCESSORS, THE DE-
FENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS. 
In the case of Wyoming vs. United States, 255 U. S. 
489, the State of Wyoming waived its right to a school tract 
within a Federal reservation and selected in lieu thereof 
a tract of equal acreage from the public lands within the 
State and outside the reservation, and it performed every 
act which was required of it in waiving its base lands and 
selecting lieu lands. The application remained in the Gen-
eral Land Office awaiting consideration for three years. 
In the meantime, minerals were indicated and the selected 
lands were withdrawn. The Commissioners then came to 
consider the selection by Wyoming and declined to approve· 
it demanding that the State either accept a limited-surface 
right-interest or withdraw the selection. 
The United States Supreme Court held that when a 
state has done all that is required of it in relinquishing its 
school tract in place and selecting another tract therefor, 
the Department has no alternative but to approve the list. 
With respect to the demand that the State of Wyoming 
relinquish its interest in the minerals in the selected land, 
the Court approved a statement in Kern Oil vs. Clark, 30 
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L. D. 560 construing a land selection under the Act of June 
4, 1897, identical to the laws applicable here, which stated: 
"The act clearly contemplates an exchange of 
equivalents. Such is the unmistakable import of 
its terms. In the case of relinquishment of patented 
lands, title is to be given by the government for title 
received." 
All of the language of Federal Legislation which we 
have hereinbefore quoted contemplates a "right" for a 
"right", and "interest" for an "interest" and title for title. 
We are confident that the same spirit has always been 
intended by the State of Utah and its Legislature as ex-
pressed in Sections 65-1-27 and 65-1-70. 
Plaintiff argues in its brief that because state selec-
tions must be made in lands "not known to be mineral in 
character," the State of Utah presumptively acquired lands 
subject to a mineral reservation and therefore the exchange 
was an "exchange of equivalents". 
The complete answer to this contention is that the 
State of Utah was never supposed to have received any lands 
"known to be valuable for minerals" by virtue of the En-
abling Act or any other congressional grant. United States 
vs. Sweet, 245 U.S. 563, 62 L. Ed. 473, 38 S. Ct. 193. Thus 
the State of Utah gets an exact "exchange of equivalents" 
when it waives all its rights (including surface and min-
eral estates) to lands by present knowledge non-mineral in 
character (which was all it was entitled to receive in the 
first instance) for other lands also by present knowledge 
non-mineral in ·Character. 
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The second argument against Plaintiff's untenable 
position here is that there is a vast difference between lands 
valuable for minerals in this age and lands "known to be 
valuable for minerals" in 1925. This is boldly illustrated 
by virtually every currently-producing oil or gas field in 
the State of Utah. None of those lands were known to be 
mineral in 1925. It is so fundamental that the Court's at-
tention need not be drawn to the proposition that an abso-
lute reservation of minerals is an overwhelmingly greater 
burden upon one receiving lands than an injunction not to 
select lands then "known to be valuable for minerals". 
The controlling and pertinent legislation, both Federal 
and State, contemplate an exchange of equivalent titles and 
any reservation by one party destroys that result. 
POINT V 
VOLUMINOUS TRANSACTIONS EFFECTED 
BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER 1919 HAVE 
EVOLVED A RULE OF PROPERTY CON-
CLUDING UTAH FROM ASSERTING TITLE 
TO THE MINERALS. 
In the history of exchanges by the State of Utah with 
the Federal Government, in excess of a million acres have 
been transferred by the Federal Government to this State 
and an equivalent number have been transferred in con-
sideration therefor by this State to the Federal Government. 
These exchanges have all transpired under the scope of the 
United States Supreme Court decisions cited including Cali-
fornia vs. Deseret Water, Oil and Irrigation Company, 
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supra, and Wyoming vs. United States, supra. This Court 
may take judicial notice of the fact that hundreds 
of thousands of acres have been exchanged since May 12, 
1919 as a continuing, uninterrupted flow of the same trans-
actions as were occurring prior to the adoption of 65-1-15. 
These enormous proportions of real property and the num-
erous exchanges entered into superimposed upon which are 
the rights of third parties and the extensive improvements 
placed thereupon by purchasers from both the Federal and 
State governments have all given rise to a "rule of prop-
erty" under the equivalent estate principle of Wyoming vs. 
United States that cannot now be unsettled by a strained 
construction of Section 65-1-15. 
An estoppel may arise against a State out of a trans-
action in which it acted even in its governmental capacity 
if an estoppel is necessary to prevent loss to another and 
the perpetration of a fraud and if such estoppel would not 
impair the exercise of a sovereign power of the state. 19 
Am. Jur. Estoppel, Sec. 166. See also Corpus Juris Secun-
dum, Estoppel, Sec. 138-140. 
CONCLUSION 
I" All the pertinent events must be viewed in one perspec-
tive and chronologically as they occurred. 
First, there was in existence in 1891 the School Lands 
Ipdemnity Act and its amendments authorizing vested 
school lands within federal reservations or withdra,vals to 
be exchanged for lands outside the withdrawn area. 
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Second, the Enabling Act was adopted in 1894 granting 
to the State of Utah Sections 2, 16, 32 and 36 or "other 
lands equivalent thereto * * * such indemnity lands 
to be selected within said state in such manner as the legis-
lature may provide with the approval of the Secretary of 
the Interior." 
Third, there follows an exchange of millions of acres 
in hundreds of transactions, under the scope and aegis of 
Wyoming vs. United States interpreting those laws to pre-
scribe an exchange of equivalent estates, all of which ex-
changes were effected under the Federal statutes and Sec-
tions 65-1-27 and 65-1-70, U. C. A. 1953. 
The next occurrence significant to this litigation was 
an obscure amendment, advanced on the theory that abuses 
were being practiced by the administrative officers of the 
land board in connection with sales of state lands to private 
individuals, to reserve minerals in the event of "sales" with-
out any repeal or modification either expressly or by impli-
cation of Section 65-1-27 or 65-1-70 and without any clear 
or even veiled threat of jeopardy to the mineral interests 
in lands being acquired from the State of Utah by the Fed-
eral Government and its successors and assigns-65-1-15. 
Still a free, full flow of exchanges between the State 
and the Federal Government continues uninterrupted with 
the Governor of the State of Utah, who had been the senator 
in 1919 who introduced the provisions of what is now 65-
1-15, administering as the chief executive officer of the 
land board the same transactions without voicing any ob-
jection or demanding the insertion of a reservation in favor 
of the State of Utah. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
24 
Next, the Federal Government assigns, the fee simple 
estate to the lands acquired from the State of Utah to these 
defendants and respondents who are bona fide purchasers 
for value with no notice of any nature of the rights claimed 
by the State of Utah under the tenuous precepts now ad-
vanced by counsel. 
From a reversal of the Trial Court there would now 
stem loss to thousands of other proprietors of millions of 
dollars in valuable lands, improvements, and mineral inter-
ests. 
We contend that the Lower Court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN, 
Richfield, Utah, 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Respondents. 
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